Altruism is not a destination. It is not synonymous with love, nor is it the ideal mindset.
It is not wrong to seek simplicity in messaging for the public. The masses need digestible truths. But behind that simplicity should be understanding—not delusion. It's time for honest, selfish people to challenge fake altruism. Speak up. Be real. And remember: one who stands still in this world will fall behind.
Choose your path with the long-term in mind. If your goal is happiness, then your method might involve hardship today. But better to walk a hard path knowingly than to chase an easy one blindly.
I recently read this article by Songgun Lee, which sparked my interest. Lately I've become interested in philosophical justifications for optimism, and along these lines I'd like to share some of my thoughts re: this article.
Lee (2025) posits a departure from altruism as a guiding principle in morality. Specifically, he focuses on "blind, absolute altruism":
However, those who insist on blind, absolute altruism—who preach "always be selfless" without room for nuance—are far more dangerous than those who advocate selfishness...the blindly altruistic hide behind masks of goodness, showing hypocrisy, discomfort, and a kind of moral manipulation that ultimately pushes others toward selfishness.
He paints absolute altruism under a malicious brush, arguing that those who practice absolute altruism "believe their delusions to be truths", "do not question their own beliefs" and use their perception of "goodness" to shield them from challenges to their worldview. Lee argues this is deceit: as selfishness is in our nature, to preach absolute altruism while selfishly slaking hunger and quenching thirst is blatantly hypocritical.
Lee further argues that selfishness gets a bad rap, especially in relation to altruism, which is comparatively positively viewed. He argues that while altruism is abstract and more of a philosophical ideal, selfishness is visceral and real, giving the example of the joy felt upon selfishly eating or resting, and contrasting this with the misery of physical suffering. Lee argues this is inarguable in so far as it is "universal". An animal, with no knowledge of moral structure or philosophy, will act selfishly as they desire "pleasure, comfort, safety"; however, altruism "is not instinctive", but rather taught. The climax of this argument is the revelation that, insofar as selfish behaviors such as eating when hungry enable us to survive, we must be selfish in order to be altruistic. Lee presents this view of altruism and selfishness not as polar opposites, but as ends of a spectrum of selfishness; in this sense, altruism is not as fundamental as selfishness. Instead, selfishness forms the foundation of altruism: "to strip altruism of self-interest is to misunderstand its essence."
There are some familiar ideas here, and some interesting new ones. Below, I will review some concepts that are directly applicable to the ideas discussed in Lee (2025). I will point out what I believe are flaws in the argument, and present a counterargument in favor of altruism.
Concepts of interest
There are several philosophical concepts which I believe are important to the discussion presented in Lee (2025). First, the revelation of altruism being part of a spectrum of selfishness is well modeled by virtue ethics. From Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, Book II):
Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, then mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it.
To live "virtuously", Aristotle posited that we must identify those virtues which enable us to be the best versions of ourselves, and practice said virtues in moderation. Courage may be a virtue we wish to adopt, as total cowardice is conventionally seen as a vice; however, too much courage can lead to foolish or reckless action, making excessive courage a vice as well. The ideal amount of courage--the "golden mean"--represents a balance between these two states of vice. In this same vein, being totally selfish and being totally unselfish are part of the spectrum of, say "generosity", with, as Lee correctly points out (using the terms "foolish" and "wise" selfishness), the ideal option lying somewhere in between the two extremes.
The unselfish extreme--which Lee refers to as "absolute altruism"--is also a well understood philosophical concept. Consider the utilitarian model of the "moral saint". Susan Wolf presented the moral martyr and moral saint in her 1982 essay "Moral Saints", defining the moral saint as someone who is as morally worthy as possible, who has achieved
moral perfection, [which] in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive.
The idea of the moral saint is identical to the non-malicious/hypocritical absolute altruist presented by Lee. However, note that even Wolf's identification of the moral saint is not advocating in its favor but rather as a critique of the ultimate endpoint of utilitarianism. A moral saint "devoting all his time to feeding the hungry or healing the sick" is not being a well-rounded person, which we intuitively feel should be necessary to be virtuous. They will be "dull-witted", "humorless", and "bland", as they will have to be as nice and inoffensive as possible in perpetuity.
Such a fatal flaw to absolute altruism (or anything) carries across philosophical perspectives. Utilitarianism naturally forces one to moral sainthood in order to maximize dolors and minimize hedons (see Bentham 1789), leading to Wolf's natural criticism. But in a more rigid system, say, deontology, which is less focused on consequences, one could not effectively advocate for absolute altruism. In fact, the Kantian categorical imperative (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785) may expressly forbid it,
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.If everyone behaved like the absolute altruist Lee describes, no one would feed themselves and society would collapse--hence, absolute altruism cannot serve as an effect universal maxim. Indeed, such a motivation is missing from Lee's argument, which seeks to identify a proper balance between selfishness and selflessness by consulting either biology,
It is the desire for pleasure, comfort, safety—things that make our bodies feel good...Self-interest is the root, the energy, and the biological foundation of our ability to care for others
or tradition,
But every moral tradition, from Confucianism to Christianity to Buddhism, ultimately links altruism to long-term personal well-being. To strip altruism of self-interest is to misunderstand its essence,
neither of which provide a clear answer. Lee correctly identifies that "these teachings function only if one believes in, or submits to, ideals like divine will"; therefore, it is natural to use the tools of moral philosophy to answer the manifestly moral question of altruism. Indeed, examining the failings of the moral saint or the categorical imperative lead to a clearer conclusion: be as altruistic as you can, without sacrificing your ability to live your own fulfilling life (e.g., by starving yourself to feed others, or giving away all your money to charity before buying your medication). If this was followed as a universal law, society could indeed function.
Having established the philosophical foundation of the ideas presented in Lee (2025), I now seek to use these tools to directly refute some of the interpretations of altruism in Lee (2025) and provide a counterargument for altruism.
An argument for altruism
To begin, I'd like to examine more closely some of the arguments made in Lee (2025) that selfishness is intrinsic/instinctive, while altruism is learned.
Selfishness isn't abstract or philosophical; it's visceral and real...This is universal. Altruism, in contrast, is not instinctive. It is taught. Ultimately, the foundation of altruistic behavior is selfishness.
Both the premise (selfishness is innate, altruism is not) and the conclusion (selfishness is ontologically prior to altruism) are flawed. The foundation of the premise is based on an observation,
When we are fed, rested, or sexually gratified, we feel joy. When our bodies suffer, we feel miserable.
It is true that suffering can bring misery--perhaps universally true. However, the assertion that being fed, rested, or gratified brings "joy" is not well-founded. Almost every major philosophical perspective distinguishes between true long-lasting "joy" or fulfillment, versus the more basic pleasure or relief felt when basic needs are met. John Mill classified these into "lower pleasures" and "higher pleasures"; in this scheme, feeding yourself when hungry is clearly a lower pleasure (it is immediately gratifying, causes no personal growth, and is gone within a few hours when you become hungry again), while the feeling of joy caused by behaving altruistically is clearly a higher pleasure (for the opposite reasons). Lower pleasures are important to experience--they help ensure we take care of ourselves and don't starve to death immediately--but it is faulty to confuse selfish lower pleasure with the superior higher pleasure of altruistic actions. As Mill famously wrote, "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied."
Beyond Mill, consider Aristotle's hedonic versus eudaemonic pleasure, or the will to meaning/pleasure presented in existentialism. Across the spread of philosophical perspectives, effort is made to separate the intense and fleeting (but sometimes necessary) pleasures of the flesh with the sustained and meaningful pleasures of the soul. Lee searches for intuitive daily experiences to inform his argument, so I present the following example: it is immediately gratifying to consume an entire roll of Oreos (a lower pleasure), but more fulfilling and satisfying long term to exercise and achieve physical fitness. The Oreos are exploiting a genetic hack--our evolutionary desire to obtain sugar--while physical fitness is a preferred evolutionary state (i.e., we evolved to desire fitness to help us escape predators and catch prey). Are these two joys the same? Despite both originating in evolutionary responses, which feels more altruistic?
So, we have established that a response being evolutionary or instinctive is insufficient to determine ontological priority. However, I argue the instinctiveness argument against altruism fails on another count: altruism may be more instinctive than Lee (2025) asserts. Unlike many aspects of philosophy, whether certain traits are instinctive or learned, genetic or environmental, etc. is a problem that can be answered with cold hard science. Numerous studies have examined the appearance and prevalence of seemingly "intrinsic" behaviors to identify whether they are learned or instinctive. For example, hateful behaviors such as racism (which are sometimes argued as "inevitable" or "just part of being human", see e.g., Wenk 2021) were examined and found to be nonexistent in infants but developed later upon socialization (Kinzler et al. 2011). Along this same vein, several studies have indicated that altruism itself is an instinctive behavior, which we possess from birth, for example:
As early as 19 months of age, children start to show altruistic behaviors. The study reports even when a small child is hungry, they will give their snack to a stranger in need. Findings reveal not only do young children engage in altruistic behavior, but early social experiences can also help shape future altruistic behaviors.
Even beyond humans, altruism has been observed in bats, rats, ants, chimpanzees, and other animals with (presumably) no moral or ethical considerations. Studies such as these and others directly contradict the idea presented in Lee (2025) that altruism is taught (or somehow derivative from human moral systems), while selfishness is instinctive; in fact, it may be the other way around.
A possible rebuttal to this point is that several studies have also indicated that selfishness in humans may vary in a way that is dependent on genes (see e.g., Knafo et al. 2013), and therefore selfishness is instinctive. It is indeed well understood that human behavior is a mix of genetic and environmental factors, and to respond to this, we must consider what precisely we mean by "intrinsic" behaviors. However, this is a detour; we have thus far convincingly demonstrated that altruism and selfishness are at the very least equal in the grounding hierarchy, challenging attempts to argue one as prior to the other.
A second possible rebuttal to this point is that, if altruism is indeed instinctive and not learned, then we must have evolved to be altruistic; and as evolution is inherently a selfish process (favoring self-survival), then altruism indeed must have its foundation in selfishness, and the point made in Lee (2025) stands. While compelling, if evolution itself has favored altruism, then there must be a deep universal truth or advantage to altruism. Such a truth is being overlooked in Lee (2025), which seeks to motivate altruism purely by consulting human-created systems of morality or divinity, which evolution as a process is decidedly not.
The existence of a possible universal aspect of altruism (such that it would be favored by evolution) leads into my final point: a direct argument for altruism. There is a fundamental asymmetry between altruism and selfishness--they are not equal ends of the spectrum. Selfishness can fundamentally only provide lower happiness; by contrast altruism is commonly cited as a path to higher pleasure. Additionally, while Lee correctly points out the problems with absolute altruism, unlike absolute selfishness, absolute altruism is a feasible philosophy for a group to practice (for an example, consider the allegory of the long spoons). Lee seems to acknowledge this:
To be clear, if one had to choose a guiding principle, "live altruistically" is generally a far better choice than "live selfishly." In most cases, altruism brings about better outcomes in one's personal life
but neglects the importance of this asymmetry. It is this asymmetry that makes "live altruistically" a viable universal maxim, while "live selfishly" fundamentally is not, thus providing a significant motivation to practice altruism, as, even in the extreme of each, altruism may provide a better, more fulfilling way to live.
The asymmetry of altruism and its apparent evolutionary preference point towards a speculative but optimistic conclusion that the universe itself may, in a higher-order/abstract way, lean towards altruism. A deep philosophical divide on the question of moral realism is broached: is the universe morally just? or is the universe cold and indifferent? Structural and organic favorings of altruism may point to a universe that is morally just on average. And that is an encouraging thought.
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